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Resumo
A Guerra de Atrição no Ciberespaço ou “Cibera-
taques”, “Ciberguerra” e “Ciberterrorismo”
Nos últimos anos tornou‑se óbvio que o mundo 
virtual das bases de dados e do software – popu‑
larmente denominado como ciberespaço – tem um 
lado negro. Este lado negro tem várias dimensões, 
nomeadamente perda de produtividade, crime 
financeiro, furto de propriedade intelectual, de 
identidade, bullying e outros.
Empresas, governos e outras entidades são cada 
vez mais alvo de ataques de terceiros com o fim 
de penetrarem as suas redes de dados e sistemas 
de informação. Estes vão desde os adolescentes a 
grupos organizados e extremamente competentes, 
sendo existem indicações de que alguns Estados 
têm vindo a desenvolver “cyber armies” com capa‑
cidades defensivas e ofensivas.
Legisladores, políticos e diplomatas têm procurado 
estabelecer conceitos e definições, mas apesar da 
assinatura da Convenção do Conselho da Europa 
sobre Cibercrime em 2001 por vários Estados, não 
existiram novos desenvolvimentos desde então.
Este artigo explora as várias dimensões deste do‑
mínio e enfatiza os desafios que se colocam a todos 
aqueles que são responsáveis pela proteção diária 
da informação das respetivas organizações contra 
ataques de origem e objetivos muitas vezes desco‑
nhecidos.
Abstract
Over the last few years it has become obvious that the 
virtual world of data and software – commonly referred 
to as cyberspace, has a dark side. This dark side has 
many sides, notably loss of worker productivity, finan-
cial crime, theft of intellectual property, identity theft, 
bullying, and more. 
Companies, governments and others are increasingly 
being targeted by largely unknown parties attempting, 
often successfully, to penetrate their networks and dis-
rupt their information systems and data. These parties 
range from the individual teenage hacker to highly com-
petent groups, and it is alleged that a growing number 
of countries are developing “cyber armies” with defen-
sive and offensive capabilities. 
Legislators, politicians and diplomats struggle with 
concepts and definitions (e.g. can malicious software 
be treated as a weapon?) and, apart from the Council 
of Europe Convention on Cybercrime issued in 2001, 
which has been adopted by a small number of countries 
there are no other treaties.
This article explores the many dimensions of this do-
main and highlights the challenges faced by practition-
ers charged with protecting their organization’s infor-
mation assets from unknown attackers with unknown 
objectives.
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The War of Attrition in Cyber‑Space or “Cyber‑Attacks”, 
“Cyber‑War” and “Cyber‑Terrorism”
This paper explores some of the consequences of the convergence of the physical 
world and the virtual world of information, data and the (physical) systems used 
to process and disseminate them, now referred to as “cyberspace”. 
The assumptions on which this paper is based are:
• Assumption 1: computer systems and networks are ubiquitous. Their tech‑
nologies, software and the operational processes needed for them to func‑
tion all have intrinsic vulnerabilities. This makes them “insecure by design”. 
• Assumption 2: societies have become irreversibly dependent on them to 
the extent that they are critical to their functioning. Examples include utili‑
ties (electricity, water, and telecommunications), transport (ports, railways, 
airports and air traffic control), finance (funds transfers, banking and insur‑
ance), law enforcement and the military, logistics and supply chains and 
many more. This makes them attractive targets to any party wishing to dis‑
rupt a society.
• Assumption 3: conflicts (war, terrorism and other) have so far taken place 
on land, water and air. Much has been written about the potential of their 
extension to space given that satellites are used for telecommunications 
and intelligence gathering by both, civilian and military organisations. It 
is plausible to assume that cyber‑space will also, sooner or later, be used in 
conflicts at least as a complement to more conventional actions.
• Assumption 4: attacks on the availability, confidentiality and integrity of 
data have been taking place well before computers were adopted. The 
hyper‑connected world of today and the growing number of individuals 
with access to cyberspace makes easier for such attacks to be organised and 
launched, often successfully.
• Assumption 5: legislation applicable to Cyberspace is evolving. Its develop‑
ment is slow compared to that of innovation, both technical and of services, 
the latter ranging from electronic commerce and its related financial serv‑
ices to social networks and much more. One of the obstacles to the develop‑
ment of legislation is lack of agreed terminology and definitions. 
• Assumption 6: the lack of a consistent national framework for cyberspace 
legislation is, in turn, an obstacle to the development of international trea‑
ties. Their absence inhibits international cooperation in identifying the 
sources of attacks if cross‑border data traffic is involved as well the investi‑
gation and prosecution of suspected actors.
The sections that follow explore many of these topics in more detail.
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Tower of Babel: from Definitions to Legislation 
Terminology
New terminology is created continuously. It is appropriate to recall the story of the 
Tower of Babel1 “let’s… confuse their language so they will not understand each 
other” which remains valid today as innovations add words to our vocabularies. 
For example:
The word “cyberspace” first appeared in William Gibson’s 1984 book “Neuromanc-
er”. It was used to describe the electronic medium of computer networks in which 
communications take place in real time. Other definitions exist, of course, and they 
have both supporters and critics.
Expressions such as “cyber‑terrorism” and “cyber‑war, (and variants of them) 
have been in use for many years. The media uses such terms liberally with little 
regard for detailed definitions. Academics, researchers and authors have put for‑
ward several definitions that remain a topic of debate. 
The literature credits the first use of the expression “cyber‑terrorism” to a 1996 arti‑
cle by Barry Colin, a senior researcher at the Institute for Security and Intelligence 
in California that states:
“The physical and virtual worlds are inherently disparate worlds. It is now the 
intersection, the convergence, of these two worlds that forms the vehicle of Cyber 
Terrorism, the new weapon that we face.” (Colin, 1996).
Another definition given by Major Bill Nelson of the U.S. Air Force states:
“Cyber-terrorism is the calculated use of unlawful violence against digital property 
to intimidate or coerce governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are po-
litical, religious or ideological.” (Nelson et al., 1999).
The fact remains that the phrase “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” 
(Seymour, 1975) is as valid today as it was when it was first used. Besides, some 
individuals referred to at one time as “terrorists” have since become democrati‑
cally elected politicians in government. A few of them became Nobel Peace Prize 
Laureates. Clearly, labels can be misleading and are not permanent.
When it comes to “cyber war” (or warfare) the same applies – the term is widely 
used but definitions remain debatable. One example can be found in a 2004 report 
that puts emphasis on nation‑state boundaries:
1  Verse 11:7, Genesis, The Bible.
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“Cyber warfare involves units organized along nation-state boundaries, in offen-
sive and defensive operations, using computers to attack other computers or net-
works through electronic means.” (Billo et al., 2004).
In his 2010 book “Cyber War”, Richard A. Clarke defines Cyber‑Warfare as: 
“Actions by a nation-state to penetrate another nation’s computers or networks for 
the purposes of causing damage or disruption.” 
Lawyers are more cautious as terminology is fundamental to legislation and leg‑
islation is a pre‑requisite for prosecution. This is illustrated by the well‑known 
opinion (on a different subject) given by a Judge in 1964:
“I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be 
embraced within that shorthand description “hard-core pornography”; and perhaps 
I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the 
motion picture involved in this case is not that”.2 
Diplomats, politicians and military personnel as well as international organiza‑
tions, continue to debate how to formalise definitions of “cyber‑war” and “cyber‑
terrorism” as well as philosophical issues such as whether software can be used as 
a weapon. It would not be reasonable to expect quick answers.
Legislation for Cyberspace Crime and Conflict
Computer Misuse and Crime
The scope for computer misuse is huge and limited only by the creativity of the 
parties engaging in this. While many countries have been working for years to 
introduce appropriate (national) legislation3 to address this, loopholes remain 
in such legislation. This in turn presents challenges in bringing criminals to 
justice.
The main problem is the lack of international harmonization of cybercrime legisla‑
tion. Investigation and prosecution are virtually impossible if some activities in 
cyberspace are considered to be a crime in one country but not in another.
The only international instrument on cyberspace related topics known to the 
author is the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, agreed in 2001 and 
which entered into force in 2004. By 28 October 2010, 30 countries had signed and 
ratified the convention. An additional 16 countries have signed the convention but 
2  Justice Potter Stewart, opinion on Jacobelli vs. Ohio,1964.
3  E.g. in the U.K. the Data Protection Act (1988) and the Computer Misuse Act (1990) (and more…).
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not ratified it. It should be remembered that the United Nations had 193 Member 
States (in May 2012). 
As an illustration of the complexities of cross‑border activities in cyberspace, is the 
case of Gary McKinnon, a UK citizen accused by the United States (both countries are 
signatories of the Council of Europe Convention) of hacking into 97 databases of the 
US Military and of the space agency NASA over a period of 13 months in 2001‑2. These 
activities included deleting critical files and posting a notice “your security is crap”.
Extradition proceedings against McKinnon were started by the United States in 
2005 and the legal process continues through a sequence of appeals.
An initiative being progressed by the International Telecommunications Union 
(a United Nations specialised agency) to support nations in the harmonisation of 
policies (leading to legislation) can be found in the public domain.4
Laws of Conflict
The Laws of War (Jus in Bello) have a long history, which is likely to precede the in‑
vention of writing. These laws attempt to regulate the conduct of Nations, armies 
and individuals in a conflict statements to this effect can be found in the Hebrew 
Bible (book of Deuteronomy) and in the Koran (Sura-al-Baqara). 
Today there are many international treaties on the laws of war (or Laws of Armed 
Conflict,5 LOAC) – the First Geneva Convention entered into force in 1864 and the 
latest treaty found, the Convention on Cluster Munitions, entered into force in 2010. 
Each one of the laws or conventions was developed after some new weapon or 
technology has been used in conflict. When it is felt that its consequences are unac‑
ceptable, politicians and diplomats seek some kind of mutual agreement to avoid 
or limit their use. This process can take many years and has not stopped various 
parties in conflict from ignoring such laws or conventions. 
From time to time, the international community refers such situations to an inde‑
pendent body such as an international (war crimes) tribunal or the International 
Criminal Court. Once again, these processes are lengthy and are supported by ex‑
isting legislation.
None of the treaties in force covers the use of information and/or software as dis‑
ruption tools or as weapons. Similarly, attacks on computer systems and data are 
not mentioned in any of the current Laws of Armed Combat, the Geneva Conven‑
tions or any other treaties. 
In past years past there have been United Nations (2004) documents on cyber‑
security and also Resolutions relating to cyber‑security (none appears to be dated 
4  Available at http://www.itu.int/ITU‑D/projects/ITU_EC_ACP/index.html.
5  Available at http://usmilitary.about.com/cs/wars/a/loac.htm.
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later than 2009). Similarly, the International Telecommunications Union has imple‑
mented a Cyber Security Agenda and also passed a number of related Resolutions. 
In their present form, these do not constitute a legal framework or a treaty.
Other international organisations, notably the Organisation for Economic Coop‑
eration and Development (OECD) have done research and issued publications. In 
a recent report the author’s state: “it is extremely unlikely that there will ever be a true 
cyberwar” (OECD, 2011).
The caveat is that the authors define “cyberwar” as one that is fought exclusively in 
cyberspace. They do acknowledge that cyber‑weapons are already in extensive use 
and that a conventional conflict that includes cyber attacks is a distinct possibility.
A comprehensive multidisciplinary report on these issues was presented to the 
French Senate on 18 July 2012 (Bockel, 2012). It includes a detailed discussion of the 
defensive and offensive cyber‑strategies of several countries.
There are more initiatives and publications by other organisations. Some are Inter‑
national Organisations, such as the Organisation for Security Coordination in Eu‑
rope (OSCE) while others are non‑governmental organisations, as is the case with 
ICT4Peace Foundation.6 The latter published a report on the promotion of peace in 
cyber‑space (Stauffacher, Sibilia and Weekes, 2011).
It can be assumed that most countries are developing defensive capabilities as it 
has become evident that attackers of many kinds have acquired strong capabilities 
to launch Advanced Persistent Threats. In parallel, there are also many reports 
of Nations developing cyber‑attack capabilities – some list a handful of countries 
known or suspected to have such capabilities. Other reports7 such as the one by 
the security company McAfee in 2007 stated that up to 120 countries were then 
engaged in cyber espionage and other forms of attack. 
The issue remains that by mid‑2012 there appears to be a fair consensus that the ex‑
isting Laws of Armed Combat and the various treaties (such as those of the United 
Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) may not adequately 
cover all the issues relating to cyber‑warfare and/or terrorism.
What the international community should have learned from developing treaties 
is that they take an inordinate time to be developed and that when completed, 
some nations will not sign or ratify them. 
Just to provide a couple of examples, this has been the case with:
• The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS), devel‑
oped between 1973 and 1982, has been signed by 162 countries. Amongst 
the non‑signatories is the United States of America – in July 2012, the Senate 
6  Available at http://www.ict4peace.org.
7  “Government-sponsored cyberattacks on the rise”, available at http://www.networkworld.com/
news/2007/112907‑government‑cyberattacks.html.
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could not muster the necessary majority to ratify the treaty on concerns that 
doing so would constitute an erosion of U.S. sovereignty, both in terms of 
international arbitration of disputes and the possibility that a supranational 
body could impose binding rulings on the U.S.
• The Treaty on the Non‑Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) ratified in 
1970 and signed by 190 countries. Four countries are not parties to this trea‑
ty. Of them three, India, Pakistan and North Korea have openly tested such 
weapons. A fourth country ‑ Israel ‑ is believed to have such weapons but 
has never declared such ownership. North Korea announced its withdrawal 
in 2003.
Non‑state actors ignore such treaties and conventions.
The current status of the laws of conflict did not inhibit statements on the subject 
made public such as the two examples that follow: in May 2009, General K. Chilton, 
U.S. Military Strategic Command said8 that: “In the event of a cyber‑attack, the 
Laws of Armed Conflict will apply.”; in October 2011, General R. Kehler, from the 
same organization said9 that: “… there is a need to define Rules of Engagement for 
Offensive Computer Warfare.” Readers are invited to draw their own conclusions.
The Yin and the Yang of Cyber-space
Chinese philosophy gave us the concept of Yin-Yang (translated as “shady place” 
and “bright” or “sunny” place). These are complementary, not opposing, forces 
that interact as part of a dynamic system. Everything has Yin and Yang sides and 
the boundary between them can change with time. 
In cyberspace these sides can be seen as:
8  “Official: No options ‘off the table’ for U.S. response to cyber attacks”. Stars and Stripes, 8 May 
2009.
9  “U.S. Weighs Its Strategy on Warfare in Cyberspace”. The New York Times, 18 October 2011.
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On the Yang or bright side, cyberspace has provided the world with: 
• Unprecedented possibilities for the creation and sharing of data and infor‑
mation; 
• Standards to enhance connectivity and data exchanges in critical infrastruc‑
tures;
• Social and professional networks for its dissemination and sharing;
• Online learning capabilities to reach anyone who wishes to learn;
• E‑business and E‑government;
• Useful tools for national defence and law enforcement;
• And so much more – creativity continues to drive the Yang (e.g. Apps for 
smart phones and new gadgets).
The consequence of this is that cyberspace is data and information‑rich and these 
are valuable resources:
• Some data and information is public (anyone can access it but not necessar‑
ily make sense of it or vouch for its quality). Other data and information is 
restricted (access requires registration, sometimes a paywall);
• Much data is operational – not accessible to the public and rarely accessible 
to individuals (except for diagnostic purposes) – and part of what is called 
Systems Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA). This is a vital component 
of process management including for example electricity generation, air 
traffic control, telephone exchanges and virtually all of the infrastructures 
on which society depends;
• There is confidential data – accessible only to those meeting specific criteria 
(intellectual property, financial and legal data, medical records);
• Finally there is secret data – not shared other than within a very small circle 
of qualified and nominated people (passwords, national security and law 
enforcement).
However data and information that have value are of interest to many groups: 
spies (industrial and other), criminals (fraud, theft, extortion), law enforcement 
(intelligence acquisition and analysis, tracking, planning) and many others.
Such data can be acquired legitimately either because it is in the public domain or 
the individual has the appropriate permissions to do it. 
The Yin side has also many elements to consider:
• Irreversible dependency on cyberspace for many, if not most, critical activities;
• Questionable Quality Assurance for much of the information and knowl‑
edge disseminated;
• The dissemination of Non‑Knowledge: misinformation, disinformation, 
proselytization, etc.;
• Cyber‑crime – non violent and profitable;
• Theft of intellectual property and other forms of espionage;
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• Hacktivism – attacks on cyberspace residents for any of a variety of reasons;
• Cyber‑attacks on information infrastructures by non‑state actors (could also 
be state sponsored);
• Cyber‑attacks on information infrastructures by hostile nation states. 
Those in the Yin side of cyberspace (“uncivil society” as former U.N. Secretary 
General Kofi Annan called them) can access data without permission by breaking 
into systems. This may be relatively easy to do if the protective measures taken are. 
However, events that took place in recent years indicate that any system can be 
broken into if the attackers have the skills and resources to implement an Ad‑
vanced Persistent Threat. This may be illegal depending on the legal framework of 
the location where such break‑in takes place. A relatively small number of offend‑
ers has been apprehended, judged and sentenced. 
Once they break into a system, intruders may do many (all bad) things:
• Disruption – website defacement, denial of service, encrypting data and de‑
nying access to it by its rightful owners, 
• Strategic advantage through espionage – advanced information on mergers 
and acquisitions, exchanges of sensitive information, intelligence gathering, 
etc. 
• Financial gain – phishing, stealing intellectual property, fraud in various 
forms; 
• Sabotage (including terrorist acts) – interfering with the operation of critical 
processes;
• Military uses that exploit the gaps in the Laws of Armed Combat and cur‑
rent treaties; and more…
Technologies in Crime and Conflict
Fighting has existed for as long as the human race. It has been given many names, 
including “conflict”, “terrorism” and “war”. Some fighting has been formalised 
and codified, by for example the Laws of Armed Combat and the Geneva Conven‑
tions. However, much fighting is not subject to any such rules.
History shows that the tools for fighting have evolved as technical innovation pro‑
gressed – from slings and stones to bows and arrows, fire, axes and maces, swords, 
gunpowder leading to rifles, pistols and cannons and so on (Alvin and Heidi Tof‑
fler, 1993).
The industrial revolution (1750 to 1850) resulted in changes in technology, manufac‑
turing, transport as well as in society. It was also the start of the formalisation of man‑
agement. All of these were adopted by the military and law enforcement (it could be 
argued that the legions of the Roman Empire already applied “management”). 
Technologies such as motorized vehicles and aircraft extended the reach and speed 
with which fighting could be carried out. Developments in electronics around the 
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time of the Second World War brought innovations such as radar and sonar, de‑
vices to facilitate (and break) encryption. 
New forms of weapons, notably the atomic bomb were also turned from theory to 
reality leading to the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction.
Since then, rapid innovation in Information Technology has enabled new facilities. 
These include sophisticated information analysis and its dissemination in the field, 
satellites for information gathering and communications, “smarter” weapons in‑
cluding precision guided missiles, drone aircraft, robots and more.  
Some of these technologies have become commodities. One of them, the smart 
phone, which includes photographic and video capabilities, access to GPS data and 
access to the Internet, are also being used by opponents engaged in asymmetric con‑
flict (variously referred to by the media and others as “terrorists”, “hacktivists” or 
“hackers” – all of these may be correct to somebody, somewhere, sometime).
The concept of Information Warfare (IW) originated in the United States of America 
and uses information technology to gain advantage over an opponent by collect‑
ing tactical information, enabling “dis” and misinformation to be disseminated, 
denying information collection to the opponent and protecting one’s own systems 
and data (Denning, 1998). Other countries refer to such activities as Information 
Operations. Courses on Information Warfare are offered by many military acad‑
emies around the world.
It is almost certain, that many Nation States use electronic means to gather intel‑
ligence. It is also a fact that every organization that uses computer systems and 
networks takes steps to provide defences for their protection. The global media 
speculates that a number of Nation States are developing offensive cyber‑capabil‑
ities and uses terms such as “cyber‑armies”. 
A conflict in which computer systems and networks are considered legitimate tar‑
gets would have massive impact: all the infrastructures critical to the function‑
ing of society – utilities, telecommunications, transportation, banking and finance, 
supply chains, etc. rely extensively on information technologies and networks and 
are therefore highly vulnerable to attack by hostile parties.
The concept of “Economic Jihad” (The Economist, 2008) – attacks that damage the 
economic interests of a nation or its enterprises and financial institutions – has 
been voiced many times over the last few years. Given that so many critical activi‑
ties now make use of cyberspace, such attacks should be considered a real threat. 
The remainder of this article explores the many dimensions of these challenges. 
Selected Cyber-events that Actually Occurred
Fiction has already explored forms of attack for years and some of them have actu‑
ally happened while others are perhaps just waiting for the opportunity. 
Here is a short selection of events yet to happen:
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• Arthur Clarke’s “2001” (1968) in which an artificial intelligence computer 
called HAL kills an astronaut to keep secret the mission for which it was 
programmed.
• Henning Mankel’s “Firewall” (1998) in which a persuasive and talented 
IT specialist plans to create worldwide financial panic by deleting large 
amounts of money from the banking system. This is not likely to have been 
the reason for the financial crises that began in 2007…
• Michael Dobbs “Edge of Madness” (2008) in which a Chinese dictator de‑
clares cyber‑war against the West and includes airplanes falling from the sky, 
power failures, transport breakdowns and a runaway nuclear power station. 
However, the following did happen:
• On 14 August 2003, a massive blackout impacted 65 million people in Cana‑
da and the Eastern United States. Officials issued statements that “terrorist 
activity was not the cause” and identified a combination of factors, inclu‑
ding computer errors.
• On 28 August 2003, a blackout affected southern London and Northwest 
Kent. The official explanation involved two independent faults happening 
within 7 seconds from each other.
• On 23 September, another blackout affected the southern part of Sweden 
and the eastern part of Denmark, affecting 4 million people. This was re‑
ported to be the consequence of the abrupt stoppage of a Swedish nuclear 
power station.
• On 28 September 2003 a massive blackout covered the whole of Italy (except 
for the islands of Sardinia and Capri) and impacted 56 million people. A 
part of Switzerland was also affected for several hours. The official explana‑
tion involved storm damage. 
Officials have dismissed the idea that these blackouts were the result of “proof of 
concept attacks”. However, the probability that these closely spaced events were 
random should be regarded as small as blackouts happen around the world regu‑
larly and their main primary cause is the weather. 
The above events do illustrate the impact of deliberate action on computer systems 
could have. The difference would be that a well designed attack involving sophis‑
ticated malware would be difficult to diagnose and repair.
Between 23 January and 4 February 2008 there were disruptions due to separate 
incidents due to damage to Internet underwater cables. The first incident caused 
damage involving up to five high‑speed Internet submarine communications ca‑
bles in the Mediterranean Sea and Middle East from, causing disruptions and in 
the Middle East and India. 
The U.S. government reported a series of coordinated attacks on computer sys‑
tems since 2003 (such attacks continue today) and gave the collective name of “Ti‑
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tan Rain”. While their exact source remains unknown the attacks are suspected 
to be state sponsored and intended to gather information. The Titan Rain hackers 
gained access to many computer networks, including those of defence contractors 
such as Lockheed Martin, and NASA.
A series of distributed denial of service (cyber) attacks on Estonia began on 27 
April 2007 and swamped websites of Estonian organizations, including the parlia‑
ment, banks, ministries, newspapers and broadcasters. These attacks followed the 
relocation of the Bronze Soldier of Tallinn as well as war graves in Tallinn. Other 
attacks involved high volumes of spam on news portals commentaries and the 
defacement of selected websites.
It was thought at the time that these attacks were of a sophistication not seen be‑
fore. These attacks have become a case study for many military planners as, at the 
time it took place, it may have been the largest instance of a cyber attack believed 
to be state‑sponsored. No country has claimed responsibility for these attacks.
On 5 August 2008, three days before Georgia launched its invasion of South Osse‑
tia, the websites for OSInform News Agency was hacked. Website kept its header 
and logo, but its content was replaced.  Alania TV, a Georgian government sup‑
ported television station denied any involvement in the hacking of the websites. 
A related cyber attack on the websites of the Parliament of Georgia and the Geor‑
gian Ministry of Foreign Affairs replaced images of the Georgian president. Other 
attacks involved denials of service to numerous Georgian and Azerbaijani web‑
sites. The governments of Estonia, Ukraine, and Poland offered technical assist‑
ance and mirrored web pages for Georgian websites to use during the attacks
In June 2010 malware named Stuxnet was discovered and identified. It was found 
to have been specifically designed to attack supervisory controls and data acquisi‑
tion (SCADA) systems designed by Siemens and used to target the uranium en‑
richment centrifuges at the Natanz plant in Iran. Other countries have been re‑
ported to have been also infected.
Press reports suggested that it made the control systems operate so as damage the 
centrifuges while displaying normal operations to the controllers.  The authorship 
of Stuxnet remains speculative. It has been suggested that the development of such 
sophisticated malware would require government resources. 
Stuxnet (and subsequently deployed malware, notably Duqu and Flame) can be 
considered to be the first weapons‑grade malware. An analysis of Flame, first dis‑
covered in May 2012 is reported as being the most sophisticated found so far and 
it was used to gather intelligence by recording screenshots, keyboard actions and 
audio (including Skype conversations).
While the theft of intellectual property and other forms of intelligence gathering 
(espionage) have not been mentioned in this section as they are common enough 
event, the Director General of MI5 (the UK’s internal security organisation) said 
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in a speech in London on 25 June 2012, that one area of increasing concern is the 
threat posed by state‑sponsored cyber espionage. He also said that his organiza‑
tion would only get involved in such cases if such thefts or disruptions posed a 
potential threat to national security. 10
Insider Threats
The information security industry places much emphasis on the actions of external 
parties, generally described as “hackers”. In reality, the insider threat must not be 
ignored.
Misusing computer systems to bypass controls can have significant impact, some‑
thing that three major banks experienced directly. While the three cases below re‑
ceived considerable media attention, such events are likely to occur “everywhere”. 
It was just the magnitude of the impact that made them known to the world:
In 1995, a trader at the Singapore branch of Barings Bank (the oldest merchant 
bank in London), Nick Leeson, lost £837 million in speculative in future contracts. 
The bank collapsed.
In January 2008, a French trader, Jérôme Kerviel was convicted of causing the 
French bank Société Générale a trading loss valued at €4.9 billion through forgery 
and unauthorized use of the bank’s computers. The case was being considered by 
the Court of Appeal at the time of writing.
In September 2011, the Swiss bank UBS reported the loss at their London offices of 
over $2 billion, as a result of unauthorized trading performed by Kweku Adoboli. 
This event has not yet gone to trial.
Other insiders may exploit access rights for an unintended purpose:
Bradley Manning, a U.S. soldier, was arrested in Iraq in May 2010 on allegations 
of having given classified material to the WikiLeaks organisation. He was subse‑
quently charged with several offences, in particular that of communicating na‑
tional defence information to an unauthorized source
Just before WikiLeaks was due to post the documents (mostly diplomatic cables) 
received from Manning, it was the target of a massive Denial of Service attack. A 
person using the pseudonym “Jester” claimed to have organised the attack on the 
grounds that such disclosure “threatened the lives of our troups.”
This was followed by the removal of the Wikileaks website and data by service 
providers. Shortly after Paypal, an online payments company cut off the accounts 
used by WikiLeaks to collect donations and two credit card companies, Visa and 
Mastercard stopped payments to WikiLeaks. The Swiss postal bank, Postfinance, 
10  Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2012/jun/25/mi5‑uk‑terrorism‑threat‑warn‑
ing.
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froze the assets of Julian Assange, founder and editor‑in‑chief of WikiLeaks.
Anonymous’ reaction: Responding to perceived federal and corporate censorship 
of the cable leaks, internet group Anonymous attacked the websites of, among oth‑
er PostFinance, MasterCard and Visa with Distributed Denial of Service attacks. 
John Perry Barlow, co‑founder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, wrote11 about 
these events saying that: “The first serious infowar is now engaged. The field of 
battle is WikiLeaks. You are the troops.”
Open Issues and Questions Looking for Answers
A substantial number of governments are fully aware that cyber attacks are hap‑
pening and are against their national interest. The website of NATO’s Cooperative 
Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, located in Tallinn, Estonia, includes a page12 
with links to documents on national cyber / information security. 
The same organization also runs courses on public international law as it applies to 
cyber operations, including, inter alia, issues such as the prohibition of the use of 
force, the law of self‑defense, countermeasures, LOAC, the law of neutrality, legal 
attribution and State responsibility. The course as run in 2012 is classified NATO 
SECRET and participation requires the appropriate clearance.
The open issues are many and relate to questions to which currently there are no 
accepted answers. 
Open Issue 1: Identifying the Attacker
So far, attackers have not identified themselves other than by citing membership 
of a group (such as Lulszec or Anonymous) whose members are dispersed around 
the world and without a formal structure. Any statement pointing to a Nation’s 
cyber‑army is essentially conjectured.
The complex architecture of the Internet and the fact that it was never designed to 
be a secure network allows attackers to be anonymous and to hide in the network 
maze. This gives them plausible deniability and, at the same time, creates barriers 
to investigators that are complex, time consuming and, potentially, not possible to 
overcome.
As a result, investigating, collecting evidence that would be accepted in a court 
of law and prosecuting cyber criminals is immensely for law enforcement. This is 
aggravated by the inability to recruit and retain expert staff. A recent campaign by 
the UK’s Government Communications Headquarters13 (GCHQ) in which people 
were invited to decrypt a message placed on a website revealed that the salary on 
11  Available at http://twitter.com/jpbarlow/status/10627544017534976.
12  Available at http://www.ccdcoe.org/328.html.
13  Available at http://www.gchq.gov.uk/challenges/pages/break‑some‑code‑puzzle‑1.aspx.
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offer was less than half of what a person with such skills could earn in the private 
sector.
Open Issue 2: Legal Framework Relating to Cyber-attacks
The development of a good legal framework remains a challenge given that leg‑
islation develops much more slowly than technical innovation and the creativity 
of attackers – whoever and wherever they may be. National initiatives are pro‑
gressed following different strategies and priorities and with little or no interna‑
tional collaboration, despite the existence of appropriate forums for this to take 
place (such as the U.N. and its Agencies, Interpol, Europol, OECD, OSCE, ENISA, 
WSIS (World Summit for the Information Society), etc.).
Open Issue 3: Can Software be a Weapon?
Given that software is an intangible element the intuitive response could be “I 
don’t see how”. As it happens, a recent issue of the journal “The Economist” ex‑
plores this from a different perspective: the extent to which electronics are used 
in health care – from robots performing surgery to defibrillators, pacemakers and 
insulin pumps – all of which are susceptible to software errors and/or attack, so, 
yes, software could kill you directly. 14 As is the case with most software, the end 
user license absolves the supplier and/or designer from all liabilities.
The consequences of an attack on what would normally be a protected infrastruc‑
ture, such as a hospital, could also be bad for peoples’ health. The same is true for 
interference with water supplies, air traffic control and so many more. 
The Stuxnet malware also demonstrated that software could be used to damage a 
physical object while being much cheaper to develop and easier to deliver.
The author could not find any reference to software being classed as a weapon in 
any legislation in English.
Open Issue 4: How do you Inspect Software Looking for Malware?
The United Nations has over the years had many weapons inspection missions. 
While no doubt complex and sensitive, such inspections focused on tangible items 
that could be counted, measured, weighed and generally evaluated.
As software is none of those things and its documentation may not be available to 
eventual inspectors, the task becomes much more complex. The people with the 
skills to identify malware (after it’s been used) and analyse it and published re‑
ports are primarily working for companies supplying anti‑malware tools, includ‑
ing Kasperski, McAfee and Symantec (listed alphabetically).
14  “When code can kill or cure”. The Economist, June 2, 2012.
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Open Issue 5: the Case for a Convention on Cyber-weapons and Related Matters
Numerous parties have suggested that such a convention would be a timely ad‑
dition to the current portfolio. Should it be developed and, if so, who should do it 
and how can compliance be assured? At the time of writing there did not appear 
to be any such initiative.
Following from open issues 1 to 4, some of the questions looking for answers 
would include:
Is there an appropriate model for such a convention, and if so, which one: possible 
models include the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime and the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) already mentioned in these 
pages. 
Such a convention could also extend the scope of the current Laws of Armed Com‑
bat and relevant Geneva conventions to cover items such as:
• Would an unannounced or undeclared attack seen as a pre‑emptive strike 
constitute an act of war?
• How does the concept of lawful targets and protected targets apply to com‑
puter systems and networks?
• How should “proportionality” be assessed in a response to an attack?
Which would be criteria defining when to involve law enforcement and the 
military?
• Who would have the authority to take such decisions?
• Can and should governments intervene if an attack targets an organization 
in the private sector (for example, a utility) 
• Under what circumstances can the government if targeted by a cyber attack 
seek the collaboration of the private sector?
The two issues that are likely to remain open indefinitely are those of Nations 
that do not sign the convention and non‑state actors that ignore the convention 
altogether.
Conclusions 
Technical innovations have invariably found their way into law enforcement and 
defense establishments on land, sea, air and space. Now they also appear in the 
world of computer systems, networks and data called “cyberspace”. 
They have also been used for criminal activities and in conflicts and there is no 
reason to believe that this will change any time soon. 
The factors that distinguish conflict in cyberspace include:
• Malicious software (malware) can be designed anywhere and by anybody 
who has adequate expertise and skills. These skills are not particularly dif‑
ficult to acquire and toolkits to manufacture malware can be procured easily 
and cheaply enough around the world. Not all malware is detectable;
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• Malware designers are good at sharing knowledge, software programs and 
tools. They have associations, clubs and conferences. Some of the latter, 
such as Defcon, are annual public events; 
• Attacks on computer systems are mostly asymmetric: a small number of 
players can successfully penetrate and interfere with the computer systems 
and the defences of large organizations in the private and public sectors, 
including defence establishments.
• The sophistication of attacks in cyberspace continues to grow. It is now le‑
gitimate to think in terms of Weapons‑grade Malware. Attribution is a major 
obstacle as the attackers’ anonymity is hard to unravel. Without certainty, 
the only practical response should focus on defensive actions and recovery.
• The insider threat must not be underestimated: insiders have knowledge 
and opportunity. They may be driven to act by ideology, external pressures 
and emotion. The spectrum of such drivers is large and includes lack of 
awareness and stupidity.
• External attackers are exposed to little risk – a failed attack still provides 
useful information of what did or did not work and insights into the de‑
fences of the target. Besides, attackers can hide their identity and location 
without too much difficulty and remain anonymous. Even if caught, arrest‑
ed and extradited, the legislative framework varies from country to country 
and requires a long process. Such a process could encourage other attackers 
to focus on those driving it.
• The concept of Mutually Assured Disruption has not been the subject of 
much public discussion are remains a source of potential social unrest as 
interference with water and electricity supplies, banking services, transpor‑
tation, etc. are bound to cause friction if they last long enough.
Many countries have created bodies to coordinate the protection of critical national 
infrastructures and their activities should continue to be encouraged, supported 
and shared. The actual response capabilities of such infrastructures to respond to a 
cyber‑attack remain to be seen. 
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